is to them Simonides should turn to collect the other half of the sum. Soon after Simonides is called outdoors where two men asked for him. Outside no one is to be seen, but in that same instant disaster strikes: the roof and walls of Skopas's house collapse, and the entire festive party is mortally crushed. Within the mythical context of the tale, Simonides is thus amply rewarded for his poetic loyalty to the Dioscuri, yet this is not where the dominant mnemonic moral of the tale is at. Legend has it that Simonides's services as sole survivor of the catastrophe are further needed once the dead bodies are unearthed from the ruins.
As it turns out, the force of the violent event was such that none of the bodies, mangled and disfigured beyond recognition by the crushing walls and roof, can be properly identified. For the congregating relatives and friends, this situation is intolerable, as recollecting the bodies of their own is paramount not only to allow proper communal mourning, but also to perform the proper burial rites that ensure spiritual passage. And here is the twist: because Simonides had earlier memorised the exact seating arrangement within the banquet hall, he manages to step by step reassign each victim a proper identity by mentally recreating the architecture of the collapsed building.
So much has been written about this legend in some of the towering works of memory studies (cf. Assmann, Lachmann, Yates) that I shall not linger much longer with the battered bodies of ancient Greece. Still, let me make two related remarks about the Simonides legend which complicate its standard mnemonic morale. This first concerns that the moment of its recording in written form -first by Cicero in De oratore (55 BC; II, , later versioned by Quintilian in Institutio oratoria (around 95 AD; XI.2.11 XI.2.20) -marks a significant split in the conception of memory. Throughout the previous centuries of its oral transmission from the Greeks to the Romans, the tale of Simonides travelled as an allegory about the cultural force (vis) of memory, a force that is concerned with the "interconnections between memory and identity: i.e. with […] commemoration, immortalization, projections into the past and future, and not least with the forgetting included in all these acts" (Assmann 1999: 28 ). Cicero's written record, however, deliberately displaces all allusions to this force (cf. Goldmann 1989) , in order to strategically restage the legend as a key allegory about memory as technology (ars).
Memory is drained of all its socio-cultural baggage in order to serve as an abstracted method in the art of rhetoric: Cicero and Quintilian advise the orator to memorize long speeches by establishing a mental landscape (represented in the story by Skopas's house), and to create imagines, affectively charged images (the disfigured victims) which represent core elements of the speech. These imagines are to be placed at fixed locations in the familiar space as set mnemonic devices, to be retraced and recollected step by step in rhetorical performance (cf. Yates 1966: 1-26) .
The epistemic split between memory as vis and ars (cf. Assmann 1999: 27-32) , and the displacement of the first by the latter in the Latin sources of the Simonides myth facilitate a second displacement, namely that of the role of (artistic) representationSimonides, the historical hero of the tale and, for Cicero and Quintilian, the unwitting founding father of ancient mnemonics, after all, was a poet; and surely there are subtle ties between memory and the economy of representation. I am indebted to Anne Carson's inspired explorations of the surviving poetry of Simonides in this context, and to her unearthing of his materialist aesthetic in the Economy of the Unlost. Carson identifies Simonides as one of the first poets to write for posteriority in his 'lapidary', in the original sense of the word, epitaphs. In these memory texts, Carson argues, he developed a unique "aesthetic of exactitude or verbal economy" (Carson 1999: 78) conditioned by the material limitations of the surfaces for which he designed his art. Yet she also reads Simonides as more fundamentally caught in the translation between two models of poetic exchange, where a waning model of poetry as "a reciprocal and ritual activity, the exchange of gifts between friends" (Carson 1999: 17) is displaced by a model of commodified transaction.
Simonides is commonly held to be the first poet in Western history to charge for his art, and he was widely infamous for his stinginess. What surely carried the founding myth of memory studies in the dialogic gift economy of oral history until the moment it was set down in writing, therefore, was its rather drastic critique of the commodification of poetic practice. In an ironic twist, the greed and miserliness of which Aristotle, among others, accused the poet, is here allocated to his boisterous host, whose penurious rejection of a poetic exchange of grace (charis) is followed suit by the extinction of his clan; Simonides, instead, is rewarded by the Gods for his unconditional gift.
There is more in the Simonides legend than just the famed founding myth of ancient mnemonics, then. It is also a tale that harbours conflicting conceptions of what memory actually is and which ethical obligations to the world it entails; it is a tale whose moral shifts with its entanglement in different media regimes and epistemic orders; it is a tale about plural economies of representation; and it might be a tale, even, that negotiates the biopolitics of capitalism against what Dipesh Chakrabarty in his dissident critique of Marx refers to as "other formations of self and belonging" (Chakrabarty 2000: 63) . hall, of course, were not crushed by ancient Gods or divine accident, but by areal bombs in the final months of the Second World War. In the 1990s, the building was redesigned to serve as a mnemonic site for the destruction brought to the world -not by scientific colonialism which is in many ways prominently exhibited on its wall -but by the racist hubris and genocidal imperialism of Nazi Germany. The testimonial logic of the palimpsestic architecture suggests that there is little connection between the two; rather, it seems to defiantly state a proud continuity of the scientific Enlightenment wantonly interrupted by the irrational terror of the Third Reich. The actual handover ceremony of the 14 individuals to their respective communities took place in yet another historically charged space, the main theatre of the Charité's Institute of Anatomy. This one, too, was bombed to ruins in March 1945, yet completely rebuild in the 50s as "the GDR's prettiest auditorium" (Charité, Geschichte) .
The ceremonial site at the centre of the steep anatomical theatre where the boxes containing the remains were positioned under Aboriginal Australian and Torres Strait flags, on a table otherwise used to display bodies for anatomical instruction, has its own disrupted history: it would have been the same site where in the years before the bomb many of the 2.891 human beings executed by the Nazis in Berlin Plötzensee were displayed as medical teaching 'material' (Charité, Geschichte) . My own experience of the handover ceremony in 2014 was as yet uninformed by these legacies; rather, it was discomforted by memories of my first exposure to that space some two years earlier. Indigenous community levelling a restitution claim is thus perversely forced to accept the legitimacy of its own colonisation in principle; consequently, it is also the Indigenous community, rather than the administrative heirs of imperial collectors, who is obliged to unearth case-by-case evidence documenting particular "contexts of injustice" (according to European, rather than Indigenous Law) which delegitimise the abduction of their 6
The term "context of injustice" was chosen by a working group who collectively devised the 2013
Recommendations for the Care of Human Remains in Museums and Collections on behalf of the
Deutscher Museumsbund (German Museums Association). The ultimate foil of its conceptual scope are the genocidal crimes of the Nazi Unrechtsregime (regime of injustice), as all members of the working group, many of whom spoke at the workshop, agreed that "a human being who was killed in a concentration camp in the 'Third Reich' and whose human remains were transported to a collection experienced grave and irreparable injustice" (Ahrndt 2013 : 316, my trans. A particularly insidious example is the installation of a specific notion of 'generational memory' in the Recommendations of the German Museums Association.
Thus, the author collective was careful enough to delineate "exceptions" which delegitimise potential restitution claims against German institutions even if there is evidence that ancestral remains were collected in "contexts of injustice". The second of two caveats specifies this:
8
From an ethnological perspective, memories of a deceased person fade after approximately four to five generations. This equates to approx. 125 years, thus providing a period of time which can also serve as a guide from a physical-7
The refusal to accept that colonial collections were amassed in generic contexts of injustice dramatically entails that the onus of proof is relegated from the holding institutions to the colonized Other. It is of little consequence, in other words, that scholars like Paul Turnbull have documented that for Indigenous Australian remains the definitions of injustice under a) and b) effectively hold for any case, given that there is a "wealth of historical evidence documenting the determination of indigenous Australian communities to protect the dead, and imperial recognition of their right to do so" (P. Turnbull 2002: 83), just as there is no doubt that "concern for the ancestral dead has been a continuing and profoundly influential determinant of indigenous identity, politics and memory" (ibid, 66).
8
The other "exception" holds for ancestral remains collected in cultures where "killing an enemy and making use of his physical remains were socially accepted" (Deutscher Museumsbund 2013: 10).
anthropological perspective. In the case of people who were killed or whose body was handled in an unlawful manner more than 125 years ago, genealogical mapping to people alive today is usually no longer possible. Consequently, it is no longer possible to identify direct descendants in whose eyes the injustice which occurred could continue to have an effect. Children are born form the ancestor's spirit emerging from the ground, relating a person with their place of birth (and incurring the responsibilities of care for that country) and […] upon their physical, corporeal death, their spirit returns to that place.
[…] The safe return of their spirit is imperative to the wellbeing of the place so that it may continue as an enduring life source and again be the site where life will continue to emerge. (Muecke 2004: 16) It is important not to essentialise or simplify much more complex and highly diverse Indigenous cosmogonies of knowledge here; as Muecke stresses, place is a highly dynamic category in Indigenous ontologies, and with the arrival of European philosophies 9
The authors admittedly do qualify that "in the case of the persecution of certain groups and genocides within a people or State of origin" (ibid.) memory may exceed the margin that both biological and cultural anthropologist seem to converge upon (a gesture, I feel, less directed to the victims of colonialism than to European victims of genocidal violence). 10 12 The French original reads: "Il est bien possible que je resterais dans cette colonie pour toujours -il est possible que mes os blanchirons sur les plaines de l'interieur". 13 White extensively draws on his reading of Chisholm's popular 1941 Strange New World which systematically discredits Leichhardt's character and bushskills, and deliberately imbues him with a tinge of Hitleresque megalomania.
Jackie went in, crowded upon by several members of his adoptive tribe still doubtful of his honesty. But the spirits of the place were kind to Jackie: they held him up by the armpits as he knelt at the side of Mr Voss. He could just see that the pale eyes of the white man were looking, whether at him or through him, he did not attempt to discover, but quickly stabbed with his knife and his breath between the windpipe and the muscular part of the throat.
His audience was hissing.
The boy was stabbing, and sawing, and cutting, and breaking, with all of his increasing, but confused manhood, above all, breaking. He must break the terrible magic that bound him remorselessly, endlessly, to the white men.
When Jackie had got the head off, he ran outside followed by the witnesses, and flung the thing at the feet of the elders, who had been clever enough to see to it that they should not do the deed themselves. (White 1994 Voss: 394) I have always been irritated by the bland racism of White's Voss; for all I know, Chinua Achebe's core allegations against Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness -that it denies Africans a voice beyond incoherent stammer, and that it essentially reduces Africa to a "metaphysical battlefield devoid of all recognizable humanity, […] I picked up the skull of a blackfellow -probably that of one killed in a fight. I was very anxious to take this to Sydney with me but after carrying it for about three weeks slung under my arms I found it so very inconvenient that I was compelled to throw it away. I extracted a dozen fine teeth, however, which I have still in my possession. (H. Turnbull 1983 32) Voss's death in Patrick White's imagination is nothing less than an abysmal inversion, then, of the tales of countless imperial subalterns severing the heads of Australia's Indigenous dead and dying and tossing them at the feet of their Scientific elders in the Enlightened centres of learning in London, Paris or Berlin.
The sombre ironies of this inversion are compounded by yet another inversion which concerns the ways in which White imaginatively lays Leichhardt's remains at rest.
The above passage from Voss continues:
The boy [Jackie] stood for a moment beneath the morning star. The whole air was trembling on his skin. As for the head-thing, it knocked against a few stones, and lay like any melon. How much was left of the man it no longer represented? His dreams fled into the air, his blood ran out upon the dry earth, which drank it up immediately. Whether dreams breed, or the earth responds to a pint of blood, the instant of death does not tell. (White 1994 Voss: 394) Voss's decapitation culminates in the redemptive union of his body and spirit with the place of his Australian destiny: the air of the desert interior absorbs his dreams; the earth takes in his blood, his skull organically merges with the land. My reading of this passage is indebted to Sue Martin, who puts it in the context of a series of earlier fictionalisations of Leichhardt's remains from the first eulogies to Lemurian novels such as Earnest Favenc's The Secret of the Australian Desert (1896). Martin argues that what most fictionalisations of Leichhardt's death have in common is that they disembody him, make him ultimately untraceable, and indelibly merge him with the land (Martin 2013: 126 Voss and the lesser versions of the Leichhardt myth do in Australia is that they allow us, albeit in a guarded, roundabout and reticent way, to speak about this enormous trauma at the heart of our nation" that is "the invasion of the entire continent by the British imperial machine, the theft of the land in order to found a new European society, and the killing or displacement of however many Indigenous people it actually took to achieve this goal" (Barrett 2013: 37) . I agree in principle, yet would like to insist that such conversations need to tackle the White mythologies around Leichhardt and their abysmal ironies head on, lest they engrain that trauma even further and perpetuate the epistemic violence against Indigenous Australians. But I also want to insist that the traumatic injustice at the heart of the Australian "nation" exceeds Australian responsibilities, just as the "British imperial machine" of which Leichhardt was and was not part has always been entangled in a larger, European colonial project.
The thousands of colonial human remains from all parts of the world in Berlin alone are a powerful testimony to the fact that the Australian trauma is also a German one, just like that of any other nation whose ancestral remains were abducted in the name of the 14 Incidentally, it is between the Tanami and the Great Sandy Desert that Leichhardt probably perished. Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Lennox and Susanne Zantop argue, "that critique of the European legacy remains difficult for Germans to advance" (Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox and Zantop 1998: 5) . In the same "guarded, roundabout and reticent way" which Lindsay Barrett invokes for Australian conversations about imperial injustice, Germans, too, must begin to more systematically explore, in Paul Gilroy's words, "the connections and the differences between anti-semitism and anti-black and other racisms and asses[s] the issues that arise when it can no longer be denied that they interacted over a long time in what might be seen as Fascism's intellectual, ethical and scientific pre-history" (Gilroy 1996: 26) . In the meantime, we need to care for the dead. We need to return them, first, from the status of scientific objects to the status of ancestral human beings, and then progressively, and proactively, as close as possible to the care of those communities from whom they were stolen. 
